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Abstract 
Using Brunswik’s (1952) lens model framework, Hammond (1965) proposed interpersonal 
conflict theory to explain the nature, source, and resolution of disagreement or “cognitive 
conflict” between parties performing judgment tasks. An early review by Brehmer (1976) 
highlighted the potential of this approach in, for example, understanding the structure of 
cognitive conflicts, and the effect of task and person variables on judgment policy change and 
conflict resolution. However, our bibliographic and content reviews from 1976 to the present day 
demonstrate that research on cognitive conflict using the lens model has declined sharply, while 
research on “task conflict” has grown dramatically. There has also been a shift to less theoretical 
precision and methodological rigor. We discuss possible reasons for these developments, and 
suggest ways in which lens model research on cognitive conflict can be revitalized by borrowing 
from recent theoretical and methodological advances in the field of judgment and decision 
making.  
 
Keywords: Interpersonal conflict theory, lens model, cognitive conflict, disagreement, task 
conflict, cognitive continuum theory, simple heuristics 
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It was during the cognitive revolution in psychology and the cold war period in political 
history when Hammond (1965) proposed that conflicts between parties performing judgment 
tasks could be viewed as purely cognitive, thus making it unnecessary to examine the 
motivations and values of conflicting parties as social psychologists might do. In interpersonal 
conflict (IPC) theory, Hammond (1965) outlined how this cognitive conflict could be construed 
within Brunswik’s (1952) lens model framework, as well as the experimental methods that 
researchers could use to study the nature, source, and resolution of disagreement between parties 
performing judgment tasks. Briefly, cognitive conflict represents differences in how parties 
conceptualize the solution to a problem. For instance, different parties may have different 
policies for solving a judgment problem in terms of the information they rely on. Inconsistency 
in how parties apply their judgment policies can also lead to disagreement. Thus, according to 
IPC theory, parties striving to make a joint judgment on the same task could conflict because 
they disagree in principle (in that they have different policies for how to solve the problem) 
and/or in practice (in that they are inconsistent in the application of their policies). Importantly, 
while cognitive conflict is different from conflict caused by motivational and value differences 
among parties, cognitive differences can evolve into motivational and value-laden conflicts. 
Under these circumstances, the underlying cognitive differences can be very difficult to detect 
and resolve.  
An early review of research using IPC theory published in Psychological Bulletin by 
Brehmer (1976) highlighted the potential of this approach in advancing our understanding of 
cognitive conflict in both laboratory and real world settings. Despite this, since that time, IPC 
theory appears to have featured little in the growing field of judgment and decision making 
(JDM). For example, in a historical review of theories in the field, Goldstein and Hogarth (1997) 
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provide only a passing mention of IPC theory when considering developments in judgment 
research. The need for conflict theories, including cognitive conflict, seems apparent in an era 
characterized by international terrorism where, amongst other things, parties disagree about the 
level of threat, and how to manage and minimize it (Mandel, 2005), and in an era characterized 
by a movement towards greater use of alternative dispute resolution. In fact, today, a theory of 
cognitive conflict could benefit from recent theoretical and methodological advances in the field 
of JDM. For instance, JDM researchers have shown that individuals are likely to use simple 
process models when performing judgment tasks (e.g., Dhami & Harries, 2001; Garcia-Retamero 
& Dhami, in press; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999); and that non-cognitive factors such as 
emotions may impact how individuals make judgments (e.g., see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). 
In addition, researchers have employed new tools such as virtual environments and computer 
simulations when studying judgment behavior (e.g., see Brehmer, 1992; Mosler, Schwarz, 
Ammann, & Gutscher, 2001). 
Our goal is to evaluate the evolution of IPC theory from its inception to the present day. 
Specifically, we consider how research on cognitive conflict has developed in terms of its 
theoretical underpinnings and methodological stance, and we review the findings of empirical 
research on cognitive conflict. Our goal is modest in that we focus our efforts on cognitive 
conflict as it directly emerged from the IPC paradigm and related lens model framework. A 
review of conflict theories and research more generally are not within the scope of the present 
paper. The article is organized into three main parts. First, we consider the emergence of IPC 
theory from 1965 to 1976 by outlining its roots in Brunswikian psychology, the experimental 
methodology employed, and early research findings. Second, from 1976 to the present day, we 
trace the evolution of IPC theory and cognitive conflict research by conducting bibliographic and 
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content reviews of publications that cite central articles by Hammond (1965) and Brehmer 
(1976). Finally, we discuss the future of IPC theory and cognitive conflict research by 
considering opportunities for theoretical advancement and methodological innovation offered 
currently in the field of JDM. We hope these will inspire future researchers.  
Part 1: Interpersonal Conflict Theory from Hammond, 1965 to Brehmer, 1976 
In this Part, we review the development of IPC theory from 1965 to 1976. We consider the 
roots of Hammond’s (1965) IPC theory in Brunswik’s (1952) lens model framework, the 
experimental methods proposed to study cognitive conflict, and the main findings of the early 
body of research on cognitive conflict as reviewed by Brehmer (1976). 
Cognitive Conflict and the Lens Model 
Using Brunswik’s (1952) lens model framework as a basis for theory and method, 
Hammond (1965) introduced IPC theory for understanding the nature, source, and resolution of 
cognitive conflict.1 Figure 1 presents an adaptation of the lens model to the study of cognitive 
conflict (simplified for our purposes, see also Cooksey, 1996). For readers unfamiliar with this 
framework it is worth pointing out that the model shows a collection of cues diverging from a 
criterion in the environment, and these cues can be used by the different parties to predict the 
criterion. To the extent that a party’s cue utilization validities match the ecological validities of 
the cues, the party will be able to achieve the criterion (i.e., make accurate decisions). Conflict 
can also occur in the absence of an outcome criterion, and to the extent that the cue utilization 
validities differ across the different parties they will be in conflict (i.e., disagree in their 
                                                 
1 Hammond (1965) applied the earlier developed multiple cue probability learning paradigm based on the lens 
model framework (Hammond & Summers, 1965) and the technique of cognitive feedback (Todd & Hammond, 
1965) to judgment in social situations, namely conflict situations (see also Hammond, Wilkins, and Todd [1966b] 
for the related study of interpersonal learning). These historical antecedents of IPC theory differ from those noted by 
others. For instance, Brehmer (1976) claimed that IPC theory was guided by the conceptual framework of social 
judgment theory (Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinmann, 1975), and Mumpower and Stewart (1996) stated that 
cognitive conflict research was rooted in cognitive continuum theory (Hammond, 1996a). 
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decisions). In the real world, the environment is often complex in that there are multiple, inter-
correlated cues that are only probabilistically related to the criterion.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Analysis of cognitive conflict involves comparing the cognitive systems of the conflicting 
parties i.e., the right side of the lens model shown in Figure 1. In situations where there is no 
outcome criterion analysis would be restricted to the right side. There could of course be more 
than two parties in which case the model would include N-systems on the right side (see 
Cooksey, 1996), and a party could also refer to a dyad or group of individuals (see Rohrbaugh, 
1988).  
The lens model equation shown below (Tucker, 1964; see also Cooksey, 1996) details how 
a comparison of two cognitive systems can be formally done: 
)1()1( 222121 RRCRGRrA −−+=      (1) 
This equation points out that agreement between parties, Ar , is a function of two components, 
namely 21RGR , which is the linearly predictable component (when using multiple linear 
regression analysis) of each party’s judgments contributing to overall agreement, and 
)1()21( 221 RRC −− , which is the unmodeled component of each party’s judgments 
contributing to overall agreement. Equation 1 can be, and often is, reduced to the first component 
if one assumes that the unmodeled component of agreement is zero. Policy similarity is 
measured by G, while R1 and R2 are measures of each party’s cognitive control over their 
judgment policies. The interpretation of C is more difficult as it could refer to several things such 
as the extent to which both party’s policies are similar but unmodeled, the extent to which both 
party’s policies are different and unmodeled, or a lack of unmodeled response variance in one or 
both parties.  
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Conflict may be due to systematic and non-systematic cognitive differences in the way 
parties solve the problem (Brehmer, 1976). Systematic differences refer to stable or predictable 
features of policies such as differences in relative cue weights, form of function relating cue 
values to judgments, organizing principles (i.e., how cues are combined), and policy 
consistency/cognitive control. Here, the lack of policy similarity means that parties may disagree 
both in principle and practice. Non-systematic differences introduce randomness or unreliability 
into the application of policies. Here, the lack of cognitive control means that parties may 
disagree in practice even though they agree in principle (false disagreement) or they may agree 
in practice even though they disagree in principle (false agreement; Hammond & Grassia, 
1985).2 
The nature and extent of the conflict may change as parties interact with each other and the 
task, thus highlighting the importance of studying interpersonal learning and task characteristics 
when understanding cognitive conflict. Indeed, an individual’s ability to learn about another 
person’s behavior is central to conflict resolution (Hammond et al., 1966b), as is his/her ability to 
learn about the characteristics of the task.3 
According to Hammond (1965, and later Brehmer, 1976), in cognitive conflict research, the 
researcher’s task is to measure the nature and extent of conflict between parties; document their 
efforts to agree; measure the nature and extent of compromise/resolution; measure the nature and 
                                                 
2 Mumpower and Stewart (1996) point out that systematic differences in policies may be due to missing or poor 
feedback, missing or poor information, bias in subjective evaluations of one’s own policy, and redundancy of 
information. Non-systematic differences may increase when the task is unpredictable or requires use of a large 
amount of information, especially in a nonlinear way, and when the party is learning to solve a novel task or a 
familiar task in a novel way (see also Hammond’s [1996a] cognitive continuum theory for how task characteristics 
may influence judgment). 
3 Research on interpersonal learning is also conducted within the lens model framework shown in Figure 1 (Earle, 
1973; Hammond et al., 1966b; Hammond, 1972). Here, instead of making a joint decision, as would be done in a 
study on cognitive conflict, participants are asked to predict the other person’s response. Comparison of the 
prediction with the other person’s actual response provides a measure of interpersonal knowledge. Research on 
multiple-cue probability learning demonstrates how people learn about the task (Hammond & Summers, 1965). 
Characteristics of the task that individuals must learn include the cues, cue values, cue distributions, cue inter-
correlations, and ecological validities (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004).  
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extent of changes in the cognitive systems of conflicting parties; and document the effect of task- 
and person-related factors on conflict, compromise, and change. Such analyses are not only of 
theoretical import, but can also contribute to strategies for dispute resolution. 
Methodology for Cognitive Conflict Research in the Lens Model Framework 
From the perspective of IPC theory, the method used to study cognitive conflict involves 
experimentation (Brehmer, 1976; Cooksey, 1996; Hammond, 1965; 1973; see also Rohrbaugh, 
1988 for group-based research methods). The standard experiment is divided into a training stage 
where parties are trained to think differently about a judgment task (i.e., develop a different set 
of cue-dependencies), and a conflict stage where the parties are brought together to attempt to 
arrive at a mutually agreeable solution to the problem.4 More specifically, after each party has 
learned to solve the task alone they are brought together, unaware that they have different 
policies. The parties are then asked to co-operate on solving another set of problems which are 
actually different from the ones they each learned.5 On every trial or judgment problem, they 
study the available information and make judgments of the criterion variable alone and then 
communicate these to one another (overt individual judgment). If they disagree, they must 
discuss the problem until they reach an acceptable joint response (joint judgment). They are then 
asked to reconsider their original decisions, and these revisions remain private (covert individual 
judgment). Finally, if there is an environmental criterion, they are presented with the correct 
solution. So, the parties must adapt to one another as well as adapt to the task in order to agree 
and achieve. 
The researcher can precisely define and manipulate the quantity and quality of cognitive 
differences, and objectively measure cognitive conflict, compromise, and change. Furthermore, 
                                                 
4 Participants may also be selected because they have conflicting policies, and so the training stage is eliminated. 
5 Alternatively, the parties may be presented with a set of problems that only one party has learned, thereby 
requiring the other party to capitulate. 
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the researcher can add complexity to the experiment by, for example, as Brehmer (1976) noted 
introducing payoffs, manipulating feedback, and involving groups. Thus, although this paradigm 
may not fully represent all relevant features of what are typically complex problems, it can 
provide a reasonable analysis of some definable aspects. As such, Brehmer (1976) and 
Hammond (1965) both claimed IPC theory may be used to guide research into real world 
conflicts. 
The basic data collected from a typical experiment includes the joint judgment, and the 
overt and covert individual judgments made by the parties before and after this (Hammond, 
1965). As Hammond (1965) noted, these measures can be used to study the extent and nature of 
cognitive conflict, compromise, and change with respect to the task, and with respect to the other 
party. (There are overt and covert measures of compromise, conflict, and change). For instance, 
conflict can be measured by comparison of each party’s overt individual judgments. A 
comparison of each party’s overt and covert individual judgments and the joint judgments 
provides a measure of compromise at the overt and covert levels, respectively. Furthermore, a 
comparison of each party’s (overt and covert) individual judgments and the criterion (where 
available) and the other party’s judgments provides a measure of cognitive change with respect 
to the task and other party, respectively. Hammond (1965) also pointed out that the measures 
could be derived on both an inter- and intra-trial basis (i.e., comparison of each party’s responses 
averaged across trials or comparison of each party’s response on each trial, respectively), and 
that analyses could examine both external and internal dynamics such as the effect of 
interpersonal learning (Hammond et al., 1966b) and feedback (Todd, Hammond, & Wilkins, 
1966). Indeed, the early research conducted by Hammond and colleagues focused on such topics 
(Hammond et al., 1966a). 
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Early Findings of Cognitive Conflict Research in the Lens Model Tradition 
After Hammond’s initial research on cognitive conflict, Brehmer and colleagues conducted 
an intensive series of studies, and in 1976 Brehmer reviewed the research that had been 
conducted on cognitive conflict using IPC theory. By that time, research had examined issues 
concerning: (a) the structure of cognitive conflicts; (b) the relative importance of the task and the 
other party in affecting policy change and conflict resolution; (c) the effect of task characteristics 
on cognitive conflict; and (d) the effect of person characteristics on cognitive conflict. Research 
had also begun to study (e) how cognitive conflict could be resolved via supports/aids. We 
describe the main findings below. 
First, conflict may persist due to non-systematic cognitive differences even when parties 
are motivated to agree, and actually do agree in principle. Indeed, while parties reduce the 
systematic differences in their policies (i.e., there is policy similarity), over time the 
inconsistency of their policies increases thus leading to little reduction in the amount of conflict 
although the structure of the conflict has altered (e.g., Brehmer, 1969). This is because parties 
tend to decrease their dependency on their old policies at a faster rate than they increase their 
application of a new policy that is compatible with each others’ (e.g., Brehmer, 1972).  
Second, policy change itself does not signify willingness to compromise but rather a desire 
to achieve, although compromise is sought when accuracy is not clearly observable/obtainable. 
When one party is initially trained in the optimal policy and the other is not, the latter will learn 
from the former if the task is highly predictable (e.g., Brehmer, 1973a). However, if task 
predictability is low, the parties start off by decreasing dependency on their initial policies. Here, 
based on feedback, the party with the optimal policy soon appropriately switches back to his/her 
original policy, and the other party also learns from feedback (e.g., Brehmer, 1974). When there 
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is no feedback, parties may compromise as it does not lead to observable inaccuracy but does 
reduce conflict (e.g., Brehmer, 1971).  
Third, formal (surface and system) task characteristics can influence each party’s policy 
development and the ease with which they can achieve, and such characteristics alone can 
explain cognitive conflict. Hammond and Brehmer (1973) did not find much evidence for 
substantive or content task characteristics influencing cognitive conflict. Surface characteristics 
refer to the number of cues, the metric level of cues, and the inter-cue correlations, while system 
characteristics refer to the distribution of cue validities, forms of functions relating cues to the 
criterion, organizing principles, and task predictability. Studies indicate for example, that there is 
greater agreement despite less reduction of policy differences when the cues are inter-correlated 
than when they are orthogonal (Brehmer, 1975). This may be because cue inter-correlations 
enable the parties to achieve with little change of their original policies (Mumpower & 
Hammond, 1974). In addition, there is less agreement between parties when task predictability is 
low because each party’s policies are less consistent rather because of any systematic differences 
in their policies (e.g., Brehmer, 1975). Similar findings have been observed for tasks that require 
policies with nonlinear function forms which tend to be more difficult to develop (e.g., Brehmer, 
1973b).  
Fourth, traditional individual difference variables such as gender do not affect measures of 
cognitive conflict (Hammond & Brehmer, 1973). 
Finally, cognitive aids may be useful for reducing conflict. Hammond and Brehmer (1973) 
applied the technique of cognitive feedback (Todd & Hammond, 1965) and developed a 
cognitive aid to conflict resolution called POLICY.6 This interactive computer program enables 
                                                 
6 This was originally called COGNOGRAPH. The emphasis is on teaching consistent new policies. However, the 
effectiveness of this aid has not been empirically tested (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). 
 12 
parties to express their policies, compare them, change them, and discover the effects of such 
changes on conflict (see Rohrbaugh, 1988 for group decision support systems). Cognitive 
feedback involves providing information about the task (i.e., ecological validities, inter-cue 
correlations, predictability, and cue-criterion function forms), the party’s judgment policy (i.e., 
utilization validities, cognitive control/consistency, and cue-judgment function forms), and the 
match between them (i.e., achievement, and its linear and nonlinear components) (see Balzer, 
Doherty, & O’Connor, 1989; Doherty & Balzer, 1988). It has been found that such feedback can 
help to speed conflict reduction (Balke, Hammond, & Meyer, 1973). 
In 1969, Leon Rappoport warned that “if the cognitive conflict model is to serve as 
anything more than a laboratory analogue, it must be determined whether socially-induced (i.e., 
“natural”) cognitive differences generate the same conflict phenomena as laboratory induced 
(i.e., “artificial”) cognitive differences” (p. 143). In fact, as Brehmer (1976) noted, many of the 
findings that were observed in the laboratory on simulated tasks were also obtained in 
naturalistic environments or real tasks, particularly for use in policy development (e.g., Adelman, 
Stewart, & Hammond, 1975; Balke et al., 1973; Brown & Hammond, 1968; Steinmann, Smith, 
Jurdem, & Hammond, 1975). Brehmer (1976) concluded his review with avenues for future 
research including examining the antecedents and consequences of policy inconsistency, and 
further analysis of real world conflicts.  
Part 2: Interpersonal Conflict Theory and Cognitive Conflict Research Post 1976 
Here, we trace the evolution of IPC theory after 1976 to the present day to determine what 
further contributions cognitive conflict research in the lens model tradition has made since 
Brehmer’s 1976 review. For example, have researchers followed up on the suggestions initially 
made by Hammond (1965) that IPC theory can tell us something about real world political 
 13 
conflicts? Have researchers conducted research on the antecedents and consequences of policy 
inconsistency as suggested by Brehmer (1976)? Are there other ideas beyond those of the lens 
model that are guiding cognitive conflict research today? To answer these questions, we used a 
combination of bibliographic and content reviews of publications since 1976 that cite the central 
articles by Hammond (1965) and Brehmer (1976). Thus, we focus on cognitive conflict research 
as it directly emerged from the IPC paradigm and related lens model framework. While the 
content review can shed light on the theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions 
made since 1976, the bibliographic review indicates the “influence” or “importance” of the 
contributions. The bibliographic review also helps us to identify new research fronts in cognitive 
conflict research emerging from the work of Hammond (1965) and Brehmer (1976). The main 
limitation of this approach, however, is that it can exclude relevant publications by virtue of 
them not citing the central articles of interest. Later, we discuss how this limitation excluded 
potentially relevant work on negotiation. 
We conducted a “cited reference” search on the ISI Web of Knowledge, Web of Sciences 
Databases (Science Citation Index Expanded, Social Sciences Citation Index, and Arts & 
Humanities Citation Index) to identify relevant journal publications in the period after 1976, to 
2007 that cited Hammond (1965) or Brehmer (1976).7 Publications before 1976 were also added 
in order to provide a full picture of the evolution of cognitive conflict research in the lens model 
tradition. Overall, our searches resulted in 192 hits, with 141 publications dating after 1976. 
After 1976, 39 publications cited Hammond (1965), 102 cited Brehmer (1976), and 15 cited both 
authors (i.e., were repeats). Thus, excluding the repeats there were a total of 177 publications 
(192 minus the 15 repeats) with 126 publications dated after 1976. (A list of the 177 publications 
is available from the second author.) 
                                                 
7 Searches were as of October 27, 2007. 
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First, we conducted a bibliographic review of the 177 publications using CiteSpace II 
(Chen, 2004, 2006) which is a bibliometric tool that visualizes trends and turning points in 
scientific literatures based on citations. The input was bibliographic records from the 
publications and the outputs include illustrations of co-citation networks either in a cluster view 
or in a time zone view.8 In CiteSpace II, the entire time interval is sliced into equal length 
segments in which citations and co-citations are calculated. In our analysis we used two year 
segments. In each time slice the co-citation network is determined by three thresholds, citation 
(c), co-citation (cc) and co-citation coefficient thresholds (ccc; this threshold determines the 
cosine coefficients in the normalization of the co-citation counts). The thresholds can be set for 
three points in time with linear interpolation between them. The resulting networks in each time 
slice can then be pruned by using the Pathfinder algorithm or the minimum spanning tree 
algorithm. The networks in each time slice are then merged into a synthesized network. As our 
main objective was to illustrate the network of the most central publications, we present figures 
with pruned (using the Pathfinder algorithm) co-citation networks based on high thresholds. That 
is, the resulting merged network only shows the most important publications in terms of citations 
and co-citations during the time period. In the merged network, individual publications are 
represented as tree rings where the thickness of a ring is proportional to the number of citations 
in a given time slice. The size of the outermost ring and the size of the font of the publication 
label are proportional to the betweenness centrality of the publication. The betweenness 
centrality measure is a graph theoretical property that specifies the importance of a node’s 
position in a network (Chen, 2006). The color of the connecting lines between the citation trees 
represents the year of the first co-citation of the publication. 
                                                 
8 Here, we provide only a brief overview of the steps involved in analyses using CiteSpace II, since only some of it’s 
basic features were required for present purposes. The reader is referred to Chen (2006) for a detailed overview of 
CiteSpace II. 
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Second, we conducted a content review of those publications since 1976 on cognitive 
conflict in the lens model tradition, and which had cited Hammond (1965) or Brehmer (1976). 
After examining the 126 publications, only 17 were deemed relevant to this review. As described 
below, the remainder (109) were either publications on cognitive conflict but not in the lens 
model tradition or on topics related to (but not directly on) cognitive conflict such as 
interpersonal learning, group decision making, and decision aids. Our content review 
summarizes the methods and main findings of the 17 relevant publications. 
Bibliographic Review 
The main results of the bibliometric analysis are presented in Figure 2 which shows the 
cluster view of a co-citation analysis from 1965 to 2007. Brehmer (1976) and Hammond (1965) 
are the two most central articles as they were the basis of the selection procedure. The 
publications on IPC theory or cognitive conflict research in the lens model tradition can be found 
on the left. These are mostly from the 1960s and 70s. Indeed, there appears in recent years to be 
a decline in cognitive conflict research using the lens model tradition, and few central articles 
were published in the years after Brehmer (1976). Although there have been 126 publications 
citing Brehmer (1976) or Hammond (1965) over the past 30 years, few of these actually examine 
cognitive conflict in the lens model tradition. Of the 17 publications that we classified as relevant 
to the content review we report below, there were two highs of 3 publications in 1977 and 1979 
and then a sharp decline to one or zero each year following that. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The upper left and the upper right of Figure 2 shows publications largely concerned with 
JDM, only some of which are related to cognitive conflict (but not directly on the topic itself). 
Here, for instance, researchers have examined how cognitive conflict may affect a third person’s 
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judgments. For example, Cosier (1978) studied the effect of different ways in which expert 
advice could conflict and the effect of their degree of accurate knowledge of the environment on 
subjects’ predictions of the criterion (see also Schwenk & Cosier, 1980). Cosier, Ruble, and 
Aplin (1978, Study 1) examined perceived helpfulness of expert advice under high and low 
conflict. Researchers also investigated factors that may impact judgment policies which have 
implications for future research on cognitive conflict (Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983), and shown 
how judgment analysis can be used to study expert judgment (Adelman & Mumpower, 1979). 
However, most of the publications on the upper left and right of Figure 2 are unrelated to 
cognitive conflict. For instance, Dinkage and Ziller (1989) explored US and German children’s 
conceptualizations of war and peace via photographs. 
Most interestingly, the bottom right of Figure 2 shows that a new research front on group 
conflict appears to have emerged which also apparently examines cognitive conflict. It is in the 
mid-1990s, after the publication of Jehn’s (1995) article on the benefits and detriments of 
intragroup conflict, and the earlier book by McGrath (1984) on the interaction and performance 
of groups, that we can observe this new research front. These new central articles and their 
offshoots are at the bottom right of Figure 2. As we will discuss later, this new research front is 
not grounded in the lens model tradition and, although they still occasionally cite Brehmer 
(1976; and rarely Hammond, 1965), these researchers use different theoretical frameworks and 
research tools than those used by researchers studying cognitive conflict in the lens model 
tradition. In fact, these researchers are not as interested in cognitive conflict as defined in the lens 
model tradition. 
Content Review  
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As mentioned above, we also conducted a content review of the 17 (out of 126) 
publications classified as being on cognitive conflict in the lens model tradition, which cited 
Hammond (1965) or Brehmer (1976). Table 1 presents a summary of the main aims, methods, 
and findings of these studies. (The main publications before 1976 were reviewed in Part 1). 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
All 17 publications reported studies that appeared to have moved beyond the theoretical 
issues reviewed by Brehmer in 1976 to investigate a new set of problems (except perhaps Rose et 
al., 1982). First, nine studies examined the effect of some form of intervention on cognitive 
conflict or judgment performance. Cosier and Rose (1977) examined the effect of cognitive 
conflict and goal conflict on judgment performance, and found less prediction error under high 
(than low) cognitive conflict in earlier trials, and under no-goal conflict. Holzworth’s (1983) 
study measured the impact of task predictability and mediation on conflict reduction, and 
reported that while there was no significant effect of mediation, agreement was greater under 
more (than less) predictable tasks. Alexander (1979) measured the effect of communication 
technique on conflict reduction, and found that dyads trained in the “region of validity” 
technique showed greater conflict reduction than those not trained as such. Harmon (1998) 
studied the effect of decision making method and communication medium on group satisfaction 
and agreement, and found that audio-communication (as opposed to face-to-face 
communication) increased satisfaction while policy modeling decision methods improved 
agreement over conventional decision making methods. Harmon and Rohrbaugh (1990) and 
Sengupta and Te’eni (1993) both studied the effect of cognitive feedback on group JDM. 
Whereas cognitive feedback increased group cognitive control, it did not increase agreement 
(Sengupta & Te’eni, 1993), and shared feedback did not improve group judgment accuracy over 
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individual feedback/no feedback, but it did increase agreement. Studies by Reagan-Cirincione 
(1994) and Bose and Paradice (1999) measured the effectiveness of group decision aids or 
support systems on group performance, which revealed that such aids were effective. Andersson 
and Brehmer (1979) compared the effect of individual and interpersonal learning on policy 
change, and reported no significant differential effects of these types of learning.  
Second, five studies investigated group conflict (Bose & Paradice, 1999; Reagan-
Cirincione, 1994; Harmon, 1998; Harmon & Rohrbaugh, 1990; Sengupta & Te’eni, 1993). These 
reported on the effectiveness of cognitive feedback (i.e., availability of feedback and whether it 
is shared), and group decision aids (where group discussion was aided by a facilitator and 
computer analyst) or support systems (where there is computerized collection and 
communication of individual judgments, amongst other things), as well as decision making 
method (i.e., structured policy modeling or not) and communication medium (i.e., audio or face-
to-face). 
Third, two studies examined potential perceptual influences on cognitive conflict. Dhir and 
Markman (1984) studied marital conflict in task definition rather than judgment performance. 
They found that feedback of their spouses’ perception of the task had a differential impact on 
husbands’ and wives’ ability to correctly predict their spouses’ judgment policies. Qualls and 
Jaffe (1992) examined how husbands’ and wives’ pre-existing perceptions influenced conflict in 
joint purchase decisions. Here, similar perceptions led to less conflict and these couples resolved 
conflict differently than couples with dissimilar perceptions. 
Finally, some studies also included measures of interpersonal learning as well as 
interpersonal conflict (Alexander, 1979; Gillis, 1979b; Gillis & Moss, 1978; McCarthy, 1977). 
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Methodologically, most researchers diverged from the experimental method proposed by 
Hammond (1965) in several ways. First, in seven studies there was no training stage where 
participants learned to perform the judgment task (Dhir & Markman, 1984; Harmon, 1998; 
Harmon & Rohrbaugh, 1990; McCarthy, 1977; Reagan-Cirincione, 1994; Summers et al., 1977; 
Qualls & Jaffe, 1992). Second, and relatedly, in over half of the studies parties were not trained 
to hold different judgment policies. Rather, in some studies parties were brought together based 
on their existing policy differences (Bose & Paradice, 1999; Harmon, 1998; Harmon & 
Rohrbaugh, 1990; McCarthy, 1977; Reagan-Cirincione, 1994). Gillis and colleagues paired 
participants according to the medication they were prescribed (Gillis, 1979a; 1979b; Gillis & 
Moss, 1978). Dhir and Markman (1984) and Qualls and Jaffe (1992) studied married couples. 
These methodological departures represent more than superficial deviations. Rather, they can 
reduce the researcher’s control over the study of cognitive conflict by, for instance, introducing 
unwanted (and potentially unknown) variability in how different parties perform the task and in 
the degree of existing conflict between parties.  
Finally, in seven studies parties did not interact at the conflict stage. Rather, participants 
were either given a simulated person’s judgments in conflict to their own (Cosier & Rose, 1977; 
Rose et al., 1982) or participants’ responses were paired (Summers et al., 1977). In McCarthy’s 
(1977) study, joint judgments were optional, and Andersson and Brehmer (1979) examined how 
individual learning compared to interpersonal learning. Dhir and Markman (1984) and Qualls 
and Jaffe (1992) simply paired individuals’ judgments. This elimination of the interpersonal 
communication between conflicting parties means that relevant issues such as interpersonal 
learning cannot be addressed in the study of cognitive conflict, compromise, and change. 
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Before summarizing the findings of this content review, it is worth pointing out that since 
the bibliographic review technique used for initial selection of publications was limited to those 
that cited the central articles by Hammond (1965) and Brehmer (1976), some potentially relevant 
work on negotiation was excluded (Darling, Mumpower, Rohrbaugh, & Vari, 1999; Milter, 
Darling, & Mumpower, 1996; Mumpower & Rohrbaugh, 1996). This work reiterates the 
importance of the task environment when understanding negotiation or conflict behavior (see 
Mumpower, 1988; 1991). Negotiation tasks do not always have an outcome criterion or it may 
be irrelevant. Characteristics of negotiation tasks are often subjectively interpreted by the 
conflicting parties, and these characteristics (interpretations) may change as the parties interact. 
The task structure in turn impacts the most appropriate negotiation strategy. Thus, in negotiation 
tasks parties must agree on what the task is and how to solve it. This work expands or redefines 
the terminology for discussing conflict resolution: For example, settlements may be efficient, 
have joint utility or equality, and strategies may involve compromise or logrolling/horsetrading 
(where parties make trade-offs so they each obtain a desirable outcome). It has been found that 
controlling for formal task characteristics, substantive task characteristics (i.e., cover story) can 
affect negotiators’ ability to reach efficient settlements (Milter et al., 1996). This work has also 
described procedures to support conflict resolution in multi-party negotiations in real world 
public policy settings (Darling et al., 1999). 
In sum, although our bibliographic review indicates that after 1976 relatively few studies 
were published on cognitive conflict in the lens model tradition our content review suggests that 
several new contributions were made by this small body of literature. In fact, the literature went 
beyond the issues studied in the earlier work reviewed by Brehmer (1976) in several interesting 
ways. However, for unknown reasons, no-one followed up on the suggestions initially made by 
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Hammond (1965) that IPC theory can tell us something about political conflicts, which 
nowadays may focus on identifying and managing threats to national and global security, 
although the work on group conflict and negotiation sometimes deals with public policy issues 
(e.g., Darling et al., 1999; see also Hammond and Grassia, 1985 for public policy examples). 
Similarly, few researchers directly examined the antecedents and consequences of policy 
inconsistency as suggested by Brehmer (1976). Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) recently examined 
the impact of several factors such as outcome feedback and cue redundancy on policy 
inconsistency, which may be worth exploring in the context of cognitive conflict research. 
Researchers also often departed from the experimental method described by Hammond (1965). 
Rather than representing useful innovations these departures appear to dilute the control that the 
researcher has over the experimental situation in, for instance, knowing the precise sources of 
conflict, and limit the study of important issues in cognitive conflict such as interpersonal 
learning. 
Research on Group Conflict: A Paradigm Shift in Cognitive Conflict Research 
Beyond the small body of published literature on cognitive conflict in the lens model 
tradition conducted after 1976, the bottom right of Figure 2 revealed that in the mid-1990s there 
was an emerging research front on group conflict that apparently examines cognitive conflict. 
The central publications were by McGrath (1984) and Jehn (1995). However, this new research 
front is not grounded in the lens model tradition and, although they still occasionally cite 
Brehmer (1976; and rarely Hammond, 1965), these researchers use different theoretical 
frameworks and research tools than those used by researchers studying cognitive conflict in the 
lens model tradition. It is worth briefly reviewing the new central publications in order to assess 
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the degree to which this research front, which has attracted more researchers than the lens model 
tradition, marks a theoretical and methodological advance in cognitive conflict research. 
McGrath’s (1984) book reviews the theoretically grounded empirical literature on small 
groups, and summarizes the methods used to study small groups. He notes that when a group’s 
task is to resolve conflicts, as is often the case, IPC theory (which he confusingly refers to as 
“social judgment theory” throughout) is relevant to understanding the negotiation process. IPC 
theory is thus reviewed in a chapter entitled “Cognitive conflict tasks: Resolving conflicts of 
viewpoint within the group.” Here, a passing reference is made to Brunswik’s (1955; whose 
name is misspelled throughout) lens model, and articles by Brehmer (1976) and Hammond et al. 
(1966a, 1975) are summarized. The experimental method associated with IPC theory is also 
summarized. In addition, with reference to a study by Rohrbaugh (1979), McGrath (1984) 
concludes that the cognitive feedback approach used by IPC theorists to improve group judgment 
is not very effective. Overall, McGrath (1984, p. 66, p. 89, p. 93) calls the work on IPC 
“limited,” noting that much of the research has been conducted only on “two-person groups,” 
and he calls the method used “very elaborate.” 
Thus, McGrath’s (1984) book introduced IPC theory and its associated method to 
researchers interested in studying group JDM. However, this was just one of several approaches 
reviewed by McGrath, and he was somewhat critical of it. It is no surprise therefore, that few 
researchers interested in group JDM have studied conflict in the lens model tradition. In fact, 
later, Jehn’s (1995) reference to Brehmer (1976) is merely to point out that he (and others) 
suggest that the relationship between conflict and performance is influenced by the type of task a 
group performs. Similarly, others refer to Brehmer (1976) simply as a means of suggesting that 
cognitive conflict may result in affective conflict (Amason, 1996). Generally, the research 
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questions, theoretical insights, and experimental method of IPC theory were overlooked in the 
central articles by McGrath (1984) and Jehn (1995), and with the exception of work by 
Rohrbaugh and colleagues (see Rohrbaugh, 1988, and Harmon & Rohrbaugh, 1990), abandoned 
in recent research on group conflict (e.g., Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). 
As the central article by Jehn (1995) demonstrates, cognitive conflict is often defined in 
terms of “task conflict.” According to Jehn (1995, p. 258) 
“Task conflict exists when there are disagreements among group members about the 
content of the tasks being performed, including differences in viewpoints, ideas, and 
opinions.”  
This concept was measured by Jehn (1995, p. 268) using a short scale that includes items such as 
“How often do people in your work unit disagree about opinions regarding the work being 
done?” “How frequently are there conflicts about ideas in your work unit?” And, “How much 
conflict about the work you do is there in your work unit?” Responses are provided on 5-point 
scales anchored by 1 = “none” and 5 = “a lot.” Others have used similar measures (e.g., Pelled et 
al., 1999). Therefore, the new concept of task conflict is somewhat vague and ill-defined, and its 
measurement is not very precise. For instance, it is unclear how participants interpret concepts 
such as “conflict”, “opinions”, and “ideas”, and there is no clear differentiation of different 
aspects of the phenomenon of task conflict. Finally, its measurement is on a short, subjectively 
interpreted scale. This approach clearly departs from the precise definition of cognitive conflict 
provided by IPC theory as the relation between cognitive systems which is measured 
quantitatively in terms of agreement (rA), policy similarity (G), and cognitive control (R1 and R2), 
and which clearly differentiates between different aspects of the phenomenon (e.g., policy 
similarity versus cognitive control).  
 24 
Furthermore, this group of researchers are largely interested in questions pertaining to the 
impact of task (cognitive) conflict on outcomes such as work satisfaction, liking of other group 
members, intentions to remain in the group, performance (Jehn, 1995), and emotional conflict 
(Pelled et al., 1999). They have typically used quantitative questionnaire and qualitative 
observational and interview methods as well as archival analysis to examine the nature and 
effects of existing conflict within work groups. For instance, Jehn (1995) measured individuals’ 
performance via appraisal ratings, departmental records, and supervisors’ ratings. The 
experimental method is rarely employed. This makes it difficult to advance causal theories, and 
their findings remain limited to description and prediction. Indeed, these researchers typically 
use multiple regression and other correlational techniques for data analysis, which is why the 
statistical textbook by Cohen and Cohen (1983) also appears in the bottom right of Figure 2.9 
Therefore, while researchers working on group conflict have focused on conflict in real 
world settings such as organizations which lends external validity to their findings, the main 
focus in this new research front on group conflict is not necessarily cognitive conflict, but task 
conflict. It could be argued that the methods employed do not represent an advance, and that the 
theories, as they currently stand, are limited. As such we believe the research front on group 
conflict revealed at the bottom right of Figure 2 does not really represent a constructive paradigm 
shift in cognitive conflict research.  
Part 3: The Future of Interpersonal Conflict Theory and Cognitive Conflict Research 
In this final part, we offer possible reasons for the sharp decline of cognitive conflict 
research in the lens model tradition, and we discuss the future of this research and IPC theory in 
                                                 
9 Although research in the lens model tradition has also traditionally employed correlational tools, these are used in 
conjunction with experimental techniques. 
 25 
the context of the growing field of JDM. Specifically, we consider some of the opportunities for 
theoretical advancement and methodological innovation in cognitive conflict research.  
At a meeting in 2006 of the Brunswik Society, a small international group of scholars 
dedicated to Brunswikian psychology, researchers offered possible explanations for the historical 
decline of cognitive conflict research in the lens model tradition and the neglect of IPC theory. In 
particular, researchers recalled that they felt most of the important and interesting questions 
concerning cognitive conflict had already been sufficiently addressed in Hammond’s and 
Brehmer’s early work, thus leaving little scope for new insights. Researchers also reminisced 
that at the time there were several other areas of Brunswikian-related research available for 
exploration which were more appealing such as the study of clinical judgment (Hammond, 
1955), multiple cue probability learning (Hammond & Summers, 1965), cognitive feedback 
(Todd & Hammond, 1965), interpersonal learning (Hammond, 1972; Hammond et al., 1966b), 
and social judgment theory (Hammond et al., 1975). From a more practical perspective, 
researchers noted that cognitive conflict research in the lens model tradition was challenging. For 
instance, echoing McGrath’s (1984) criticism, researchers complained that the proposed 
experimental method was inefficient since it required many participants and much time. 
Furthermore, researchers noted that later generations of students were not always sufficiently 
trained to conduct the relatively complex statistical analysis required by the lens model equation. 
It is however, premature to conclude that cognitive conflict research in the lens model 
tradition conducted to date has provided a complete picture of cognitive conflict, compromise, 
and change. None of the questions addressed in the early work have been fully explored. For 
instance, the effects of task characteristics on conflict, compromise, and change need to be 
examined more comprehensively, as do the role of person characteristics. And, much more 
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research is needed on real world conflicts. In addition, there are other empirical questions that 
have yet to be addressed, which may contribute to a theoretical understanding of how conflict, 
compromise, and change are influenced by parties’ subjective interpretations of events, and their 
opportunity to learn the task. For instance, what is the role of task definition in cognitive 
conflict? What are the antecedents and consequences of perceived rather than actual conflict? 
What is the effect of lack of feedback or delayed feedback on compromise and change? Is the 
nature of compromise and change different when parties conflict in a problem where there is no 
outcome criterion? Beyond this, conducting cognitive conflict research in the context of the fast 
expanding field of JDM lends several opportunities. By taking into account recent theoretical and 
empirical developments researchers can make theoretical advancements to IPC theory and 
integrate it with other approaches, as well as study emergent research questions. Moreover, by 
adopting new methodological innovations researchers can overcome some of the practical 
challenges to conducting cognitive conflict research in the lens model tradition. 
Potential for Theoretical Advancement 
There have been several developments in the field of JDM that may be used to advance 
IPC theory. Two such inter-related developments, which were partly inspired by Brunswikian 
psychology, concern the nature of the cognitive models that are constructed when investigating 
JDM. Typically, researchers working in the lens model tradition have developed models of 
cognition using statistical regression techniques (see Cooksey, 1996). These are static, structural 
models that describe how people weight and combine information but not how they search for it, 
and they suggest people use the same cues in the same way for deciding on different judgment 
problems in a task. Using these models, researchers have portrayed the judgment process as a 
linear, compensatory integration of multiple cues (see Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). 
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However, recently, it has been argued that regression models do not provide a 
psychologically plausible or flexible and adaptive description of human JDM (see Dhami & 
Harries, 2001; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999), even though they can 
capture simple processes (see Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). In fact, it has been demonstrated that 
people frequently use simple heuristics (e.g., Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Ayton, 2001), especially 
under certain circumstances (e.g., Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, in press; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 
1999). These are dynamic, process models that describe information search, stop, and decision 
making. They suggest that people may use different cues in different ways for deciding on 
different judgment problems in a task. Often, these “fast and frugal” heuristics, as they are 
called, portray the judgment process as non-compensatory, such that people base decisions on 
one cue alone. 
Brunswik (1955, 1956) did not rule out the use of other models, neither did Hammond 
(1955; 1996b), and Brehmer (1979) recognized this. Thus, alternative visions of the lens model 
have recently been proposed (see Dhami & Harries, 2001; Gigerenzer & Kurz, 2001), and simple 
heuristics have been adopted by some researchers in other areas of Brunswikian-related research 
such as social judgment theory research (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Dhami & Harries, 2001; 
Kee et al., 2003). Similarly, it may be worth employing a simple heuristics approach to IPC 
theory, and examining how simple cognitive strategies fare in conflict situations. Researchers 
can examine the extent to which the findings of past cognitive conflict research generalize to 
situations where (one or both) conflicting parties use non-compensatory strategies. Indeed, 
advocates of the simple heuristics approach have argued for the superiority of these simple 
cognitive strategies relative to regression models in terms of, for example, achievement/accuracy 
(e.g., Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), and so a simple 
 28 
heuristics approach to IPC theory and cognitive conflict research can indicate whether simple 
heuristics are also valuable in social (conflict) situations. Researchers can also investigate the 
pattern of information search and stop during conflict, compromise, and change. The fact that 
simple heuristics do not require the type of statistical analysis necessary for regression analysis 
also means that less numerically minded students may feel competent to study cognitive conflict.  
Another development in the field of JDM that can be used to advance IPC theory concerns 
the nature of the factors that are used to explain cognitive conflict, compromise, and change. 
While working during the “cognitive revolution” in psychology, Hammond (1965) strived to 
show how cognition alone was relevant to conflict. In his vision of the future he saw that 
“conflict between men will be derived from their cognitive differences” (Hammond, 1965, p. 
65). Similarly, Brehmer (1979, p. 1000) concluded that “cognitive factors may produce conflict 
and that cognitive factors alone may cause prolonged disagreement, even in the absence of 
differences in interest or emotional factors.” 
However, there has been a growing recognition in the field of JDM of the importance of 
non-cognitive factors such as emotions (see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Emotions 
experienced at the point of JDM as well as emotions that an individual expects to experience 
from the outcome of his/her decision may impact the cognitive process and judgment behavior. 
For instance, in the context of risk, Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, and Welch (2001) claim that 
anticipatory emotions can have a direct impact on judgment behavior. Furthermore, they state 
that both anticipated and anticipatory emotions can have an indirect impact on judgment 
behavior via influencing the cognitive process. Research using both a valence-based and an 
emotion-specific approach tends to support these claims (e.g., Clore, 1992; Johnson & Tversky, 
1983; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Zajonc, 1980). For example, experienced anger may lead people 
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to be risk-seeking, while expected regret may lead them to be risk-averse. There is also evidence 
to suggest that emotions can have both benefits and drawbacks for JDM (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Frijda; 1986; Loewenstein, 1996; Slovic, 2001). For example, 
expected emotions can help the individual make decisions that take consequences into account, 
but forecasts need to be relevant and accurate. Immediate emotions can help him/her focus on 
important events, provide useful information and motivation, but can drive the individual to act 
contrary to long-term goals and can influence forecasts. 
It may be worth expanding IPC theory to include non-cognitive factors, and in particular, 
examining the role of emotions in conflict situations. Researchers could examine the direct and 
indirect impact that specific expected and experienced emotions (e.g., anger, regret, sadness, and 
happiness) have on the willingness to compromise and agree (or capitulate), ability to change, 
and on consistency. While negative emotions may lead conflict to continue and make agreement 
difficult to reach, positive emotions may facilitate compromise and change. In fact, emotions 
may also alter the conflict resolution strategies that parties use, and how they perceive and 
interact with one another (e.g., Forgas, 1998; van Kleef, de Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). Emotions 
may also impact the party’s perception of the outcome. Finally, inclusion of emotional factors in 
IPC theory and cognitive conflict research can indicate further potential sources of expected and 
experienced emotions (i.e., from aspects of the conflict situation), which may be useful to those 
specializing in emotion research.  
The potential for IPC theory and cognitive conflict research to employ process models that 
describe conflicting parties as using simple heuristics and being influenced by emotions is 
compatible with Hammond’s (1996a, 2000) cognitive continuum theory (CCT). CCT is a recent 
Brunswikian-related development which highlights the interplay between characteristics of the 
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task and modes of cognition. Cognition can be placed on a continuum from the intuitive to the 
analytic, although the most common type incorporates elements of both and is called 
quasirationality. Intuitive cognition is characterized by, for example, low cognitive control and 
awareness of cognitive activity but high speed of processing; whereas analytic cognition involves 
for example, high cognitive control and awareness of cognitive activity but slow speed of 
processing. Tasks can induce certain modes of cognition, and successful performance on a task 
inhibits movement along the continuum while failure may stimulate transition to other modes of 
cognition. Importantly, performance is contingent on the correspondence between the task 
properties and the individual’s cognitive mode. It has been suggested that certain task 
characteristics such as having more than five cues, inter-cue correlations, pictorial presentation 
of information, many decision alternatives, no outcome feedback, familiarity with the task, and 
time pressure all induce an intuitive mode of cognition. The reverse of these induces an analytic 
mode of cognition, whereas a combination of the two types of task characteristics will induce 
quasirationality. Simple heuristics and emotions imply an intuitive mode of cognition, and it may 
be worthwhile studying how this mode relative to others may impact conflict resolution. 
Potential for Methodological Innovation 
Technological advances mean that researchers in the field of JDM have a wider variety of 
methodological tools available to them to develop and test their theories. As Dhami et al. (2004) 
point out, although experimentation is important, it has been supplemented by other methods 
such as virtual environments and computer simulations. Computer generated “microworlds” can 
simulate the conditions of naturalistic environments that participants repeatedly interact with. As 
with research on naturalistic decision making (see Zsambok & Klein, 1997), virtual 
environments can be characterized by time pressure, limited information, uncertainty, limited 
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resources, imprecise goals, high stakes, and dynamic conditions. Expert or professional JDM 
(individual or group) such as fire commanders and military leaders can be examined, as well as 
that of novices. However, instead of relying on descriptive accounts via observations, interviews, 
case studies, and “cognitive task analysis” as is the case in the subfield of naturalistic decision 
making, researchers using microworlds can manipulate and control aspects of the task and 
conflict situation, as well as obtain repeated measurements. Microworlds have been used in JDM 
to, for example, study dynamic decision making and judgment biases (e.g., Brehmer, 1992; 
Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; Fiedler, Walther, Freytag, & Plessner, 2002). Researchers can use 
microworlds to test their understanding of cognitive conflict, compromise, and change in 
naturalistic settings. 
Computer simulation has been shown to be a particularly useful method of theory 
development since it allows precise and transparent specification of a theory, and rigorous and 
efficient testing of its implications (Mosler et al., 2001). Simulation models can be validated by 
comparison with past research findings, and the models can be used to design further research 
studies. Simulations have practical advantages: For instance, they can model dynamic processes, 
involve repeated trials, allow within-subjects analysis, and allow examination of individual or 
group behavior. Computer simulations have been used in JDM to, for example, model the 
overconfidence effect and hindsight bias (e.g., Hertwig, Fanselow, & Hoffrage, 2003; Pohl, 
Einsenhauer, & Hardt, 2003), as well as the outcomes of using different negotiation strategies 
(e.g., Darling & Mumpower, 1992). Similarly, computer simulations can be employed by 
researchers to develop and test the above suggested advancements of IPC theory, namely by 
including simple heuristics and emotions. 
Concluding Remarks 
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As our review shows, Hammond’s (1965) IPC theory and his vision of cognitive conflict 
research have, since Brehmer’s (1976) review, been “lost in translation” and neglected 
altogether. This is regrettable since there is a need for conflict theories, including cognitive 
conflict, in the current socio-political era characterized by international terrorism where parties 
disagree about the level of threat, and how to manage and minimize it, and where there is a 
growing movement towards use of alternative dispute resolution techniques. Already equipped 
with a precise theory and rigorous method, researchers studying cognitive conflict in the lens 
model tradition can make the most of opportunities offered in the growing field of JDM to 
consider conflicts where parties may use more or less simple strategies and where they may be 
influenced by emotions in natural environments. We hope the present paper inspires future 
researchers of cognitive conflict. 
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Table 1. Content Review of Cognitive Conflict Research in the Lens Model Tradition 
 
Study and Main Aims Methodology* Main Findings 
Cosier and Rose (1977): 
Effects of cognitive conflict 
and goal conflict on 
judgment performance. 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage:  
 Introduced goal conflict (differential 
payoffs for predictions by each S in a 
pair v. equal payoff). 
 No interpersonal discussion (Ss given 
simulated others’ judgments more or less 
in conflict with own). 
 Less prediction error under high (than low) 
cognitive conflict in earlier trials. 
 Prediction error greater under goal (than no-
goal) conflict. 
 Prediction error reduced over trials. 
McCarthy (1977): Analysis 
of cognitive conflict 
reduction and interpersonal 
understanding under no 
outcome feedback. 
 Lens model with no criterion (outcome 
feedback or accuracy measure). 
 Ss had existing policy differences. 
 No training stage. 
 Conflict stage:  
 Joint judgments optional. 
 No gender differences at conflict stage. 
 Policy consistency and similarity increased 
in later trials; agreement increased over trials. 
 Initial consistency determines agreement 
more than similarity does, but over trials 
similarity increases so becoming equal 
determinant of agreement. 
 Discussion duration decreases over trials. 
 Dyads’ decision to reach joint judgment 
similar over trials. 
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 Ss assume initial policy similarity. 
 If no discussion permitted males show 
reduced agreement than females. 
 Ss good at predicting others’ judgments. 
Summers, Ashworth, and 
Feldman-Summers (1977): 
Analysis of interpersonal 
conflict in context of 
societal problem solutions. 
 No training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 No interpersonal discussion (Ss’ 
responses randomly paired). 
 Policy similarity high, but consistency lower, 
so level of agreement limited. 
 Nonlinear/unmodeled component of Ss’ 
policies negligible. 
Alexander (1979): Effects of 
communication technique 
on reducing cognitive 
conflict and interpersonal 
learning. 
 Training stage: 
 Instructed Ss in communication 
techniques (‘region of validity’ and 
supportive) or not. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Included interpersonal learning phase. 
 Trained dyads had greater conflict reduction 
than untrained dyads. 
 Conflict reduction increased over trials. 
 Cognitive consistency and similarity 
increased over trials. 
 Dyads with greater conflict reduction 
communicated differently than dyads with 
less conflict reduction. 
 No difference in interpersonal understanding 
of trained and untrained dyads. 
Gillis and Moss (1978): 
Effect of antipsychotic and 
antidepressant medication 
 Ss receiving medication (Amitriptyline-
perphenazine, AP, or amitriptyline-
haloperidol, AH). 
 AH group had higher agreement than AP. 
 AH had more policy similarity than AP. 
 No difference in policy consistency between 
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on conflict resolution and 
interpersonal learning. 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Ss in medication conditions paired. 
 Included interpersonal learning phase. 
groups. 
 No difference between groups in accuracy of 
predicting other’s judgments in a pair.  
Andersson and Brehmer 
(1979): Effects of 
interpersonal learning on 
policy change. 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Same or different task Ss were trained in. 
 Involved individual learning (as in the 
training phase) or interpersonal learning. 
 No effect of learning type on policy change 
under same or different task at conflict stage. 
 Ss adapted slower to task at conflict stage if 
it is different from training phase than if the 
same. 
Gillis (1979a): Effects of 
antipsychotic medication on 
conflict resolution. 
 Ss receiving medication (thioridazine only, 
T-only, thioridazine in combination, TC, 
trifluoperazine, T, haloperidol, H). 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Ss receiving same medication paired. 
 No difference in agreement and policy 
similarity across the four groups. 
 Policy consistency differed for Ss taught 
linear versus nonlinear policy. 
 Ss less consistent over trials. 
 H group most resistant to reducing weight of 
trained cue, T-only most difficultly in 
learning new cue, and T best at reducing 
weight on old cue and using new cue. 
Gillis (1979b): Effects of 
antipsychotic medication on 
conflict resolution and 
interpersonal learning. 
 Ss receiving medication (fluphenazine or 
trifluoperazine) or not. 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 No difference in agreement, policy similarity, 
and consistency across the three groups. 
 Over trials, Ss in no medication group had 
greater increases in policy similarity and 
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 Ss in three conditions paired with Ss 
receiving no/other medication (whose 
data is unanalyzed). 
 Included interpersonal learning phase. 
consistency than other two groups, who 
decreased in consistency and similarity. 
 Agreement did not improve over trials. 
 No difference between groups in accuracy of 
predicting other’s judgments in a pair, or on 
other measures of interpersonal learning. 
Rose, Menasco, and Curry 
(1982): Effects of form of 
cognitive conflict, 
information environment, 
and cognitive complexity on 
judgment performance. 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Task at conflict stage required equal or 
different cue weights. 
 Ss told task different at conflict stage. 
 No interpersonal discussion (Ss given 
simulated others’ judgments in inverted 
or simple conflict to own). 
 Task cue weights and conflict type interacted 
so achievement higher under different 
weights-simple conflict and equal weights-
inverted conflict, but lower under equal 
weights-simple conflict and different 
weights-inverted conflict. 
 Achievement increased over trials, especially 
under different weights-inverted conflict 
 Achievement not higher under equal than 
different weights. 
 No difference in achievement between more 
or less cognitive complexity/information 
processing Ss. 
Holzworth (1983): Effects 
of task predictability and 
mediation on conflict 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Task at conflict stage more or less 
 Greater agreement in more (than less) 
predictable task. 
 No effect of task predictability on policy 
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reduction. predictable. 
 Introduced third-party ‘mediators’ (with 
congruent or incongruent knowledge) or 
not at second phase of conflict stage. 
similarity. 
 Agreement but not similarity increased over 
trials. 
 No effect of mediation on agreement or 
similarity, or joint judgments. 
 Over trials, judges’ knowledge and 
achievement increased but policy 
consistency did not, but for mediators no 
change on any measures. 
 Judges’ and mediators’ achievement and 
consistency greater in more (than less) 
predictable task. 
Dhir and Markman (1984): 
Analysis of marital conflict. 
 Case study of married couple. 
 No training stage. 
 Couple generated cues that made cases. 
 Each S provided a priori subjective cue 
weights and function forms, and those of 
their partner, before making judgments. 
 Each S given cognitive feedback of own 
and partner’s policy, then asked to revise 
own cue weights, before making 
judgments on new task. 
 Wife’s ability to predict husband’s policy 
decreased after cognitive feedback, but 
husband’s ability to predict his wife’s policy 
increased. 
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 No conflict stage. 
Harmon and Rohrbaugh 
(1990): Effects of level of 
cognitive feedback on 
judgment accuracy and 
agreement. 
 Ss had existing policy differences. 
 No training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Ss’ individual judgment policies 
captured. 
 Ss in 3/4/5/6-person groups (cognitive 
feedback shared among all members, 
cognitive feedback given individually, 
no cognitive feedback).  
 Groups arrived at consensual policies. 
 Ss made individual judgments. 
 No differences between individual level and 
no feedback conditions (combined and 
called “reduced” feedback). 
 No difference in accuracy of group 
judgments between reduced feedback and 
shared feedback conditions. 
 Individual judgments more accurate in shared 
than reduced feedback condition. 
 Greater agreement in shared than reduced 
feedback condition. 
 Ss’ support for group policy similar for both 
conditions. 
 No differences between conditions in Ss’ 
ratings of satisfaction, difficulty, and 
enjoyableness of method for dealing with 
conflict. 
Qualls and Jaffe (1992): 
Analysis of conflict in 
husbands’ and wives’ joint 
purchase decisions. 
 Used married couples. 
 Collected data on husbands’ and wives’ 
perceptions. 
 No training stage. 
 Made individual judgments. 
 Couples with similar (than dissimilar) 
perceptions showed less conflict. 
 Conflict in perceptions of household 
influence and individual preferences 
increased as decision importance increased 
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 No conflict stage. and joint decisions occurred. 
 Couples with similar perceptions resolved 
conflict via bargaining more when decision 
was more important. 
 Couples with dissimilar perceptions used 
capitulation and avoidance-withdrawal. 
Sengupta and Te’eni (1993): 
Effects of cognitive 
feedback on group judgment 
convergence. 
 Training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Ss in 3-person groups based on 
heterogeneity of individual judgments. 
 Individuals in groups given feedback of 
others’ judgments (and cognitive 
feedback for those in this condition). 
 Ss made individual judgments. 
 Groups given feedback of group 
members’ judgments (and cognitive 
feedback for one condition) 
 Groups make joint judgments. 
 Cognitive feedback increased cognitive 
control (including across time) at both the 
individual and group level. 
 Cognitive feedback did not increase strategy 
convergence, which occurred regardless over 
time. 
Reagan-Cirincione (1994): 
Effect of group decision 
aids on group judgment 
accuracy. 
 No training stage. 
 Ss provided cue weights and function 
forms, and made judgments. 
 Ss given cognitive feedback and they 
 Statisticized groups (policy of group using 
averaged revised individual weights and 
function forms) less accurate than best 
member, and aided group. 
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provided revised weights and forms. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Ss in 4/5-person groups based on 
heterogeneity of revised weights and 
forms. 
 Group discussion aided by facilitator and 
computer analyst. 
 Groups shown individuals’ revised 
weights and forms, groups agreed on 
weights and forms, made judgments, 
judgments also made using groups’ 
policy, groups given cognitive feedback, 
allowed to revise weights and forms, 
made judgments again, and agreed on 
final policy. 
 Aided groups more accurate than best 
member. 
 No difference between groups’ and best 
member’s accuracy before feedback. 
 Ss’ accuracy not improved after feedback. 
 Groups’ accuracy not improved over task 
phases, but groups performed better at last 
phase compared to first. 
 
Harmon (1998): Effects of 
decision making method and 
communication medium on 
group satisfaction and 
agreement. 
 Ss had existing policy differences. 
 No training stage. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Ss’ individual judgment policies 
captured. 
 Ss in 3/4/5-person groups (conventional 
decision method with face-to-face 
 No effect of decision making method on 
satisfaction. 
 Audio-communication perceived as more 
satisfying than face-to-face communication. 
 No effect of communication medium on 
agreement. 
 Policy modeling method (via imposing 
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communication, conventional with 
audio, policy modeling decision method 
with face-to-face, policy modeling with 
audio).  
 Groups arrived at consensual policies. 
 Ss made individual judgments. 
structure on interaction rather than computer-
generated cognitive feedback) led to more 
agreement than conventional decision 
method. 
 No interaction effect of decision method and 
communication medium. 
Bose and Paradice (1999): 
Effects of group decision 
support systems on group 
judgment performance. 
 Training stage: 
 Trained to use decision aid. 
 Ss made individual judgments. 
 Conflict stage: 
 Ss in 3-person groups based on 
heterogeneity of individual judgments. 
 Introduced group decision support 
system (Level 1 aid, Level 2 aid, none).  
 Ss made individual judgments with aids. 
 Ss completed survey on attitudes and 
perceptions of support systems. 
 No difference between Level 1 aid and no aid 
in group agreement, post-decisional 
confidence, or individual and group 
consistency. 
 Group agreement, post-decisional 
confidence, and consistency higher under 
Level 2 than Level 1 aids. 
 Ss’ attitudes and perceptions for group 
judgment and process more positive under 
Level 2 than Level 1 aids. 
 
 Note. *Only relevant changes to the standard method involving a training and conflict stage described in Part 1 of the paper are noted 
here.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Lens model for study of interpersonal conflict and interpersonal learning (adapted from 
Hammond [1965] and Hammond et al., [1966b]) 
Figure 2. Co-citation network of publications 1965-2007 (2 years slice, parameters c, cc, ccv: 3, 
2, 25; 3, 3, 25; 4, 4, 25) 
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